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Abstract
We investigate stochastic differential games of optimal trading comprising a finite population. There are
market frictions in the present framework, which take the form of stochastic permanent and temporary price
impacts. Moreover, information is asymmetric among the traders, with mild assumptions. For constant
market parameters, we provide specialized results. Each player selects her parameters based not only on her
informational level but also on her particular preferences. The first part of the work is where we examine
the unconstrained problem, in which traders do not necessarily have to reach the end of the horizon with
vanishing inventory. In the sequel, we proceed to analyze the constrained situation as an asymptotic limit of
the previous one. We prove the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium in both frameworks, alongside
a characterization, under suitable weak interaction assumptions. We conclude the paper by presenting an
extension of the basic model to a hierarchical market, for which we establish the existence, uniqueness, and
characterization of a Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium.
Keywords: Finite Population Games, Optimal Execution, Price Impacts, Hierarchic Games, Asymmetric
Information.
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1. Introduction
It is often the case that large institutional investors have to execute large trades. For instance, when
there is a market shock, it is common for these agents to diminish their exposure in certain assets to comply
with regulatory requirements, see [12, 51]. In these circumstances, a plethora of issues arise. Here, we are
mainly concerned with two of these, namely: (i) having to deal with market frictions; (ii) facing the presence
of arbitrageurs trying to profit out of the pressure exerted by sizeable trades on the price of the assets.
Transaction costs can be intelligible in simple terms, such as brokerage firms’ fees, or can have a more
complex nature, such as the commonly designated indirect costs. There are two popular research directions
on the optimal trade execution problem in the context of markets with frictions. The first one began by
Bertsimas and Lo, and Almgren and Chriss, in the seminal works [1, 2, 8], and the other by Obizhaeva and
Wang (see [46]). The latter introduces supply-demand functions for the Limit Order Book (LOB), deriving
a price impact process for a LOB aspect called resilience. We can see the former approach as a particular
case of the second one, namely, its high resilience limit. We will focus henceforth on the Almgren-Chriss
(AC) setting. The literature in this direction is quite rich, e.g., see the books [17, 34] and the references
therein.
The AC model is a phenomenological one, in which costs stem from limited liquidity, which manifests
in two kinds of price impact: permanent and temporary. On the one hand, the effect of a given agent’s
trading rate in the dynamics of the asset price is what we understand as a permanent price impact. On the
other hand, the temporary price impact refers to the additional cost per share that the investor incurs by
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consuming layers of liquidity within the LOB (a process often referred to as “walking the book”) to execute
an order fully. Empirically, there are assessments of the reasonableness of this model in [17, 49].
There are several possible extensions of the AC model in the multiplayer setting. One possible direction
is, e.g., to proceed as in [4, 30] or in the case of the dealer market of [11], in which the asset’s price is, in a
certain sense, determined to be an equilibrium resulting from a market clearing condition. This approach
seems more suited to investigate the problem from a price formation perspective. In another direction, we
adopt a more phenomenological modeling viewpoint, relatively close to [15, 28, 38], or the open market of
[11]. More precisely, we assume that the asset’s mid-price reacts to the aggregate action of the traders.
This reaction happens in a detrimental way to the overall population movement, i.e., an aggregate sell (buy)
pressure pushes the price down (up). For some pertinent discussions in this direction, see [14, 21].
Related literature. In the works [11, 30], authors study equilibria determined by a market clearing
condition. As a first step, they assume the price to be given, implying each player’s corresponding behavior.
Subsequently, they solve decoupled individual optimization problems. In the sequel, they determine the
equilibrium price via the balance condition (at least asymptotically), assuming the players’ previously derived
individual actions. This approach leads to a fixed point problem, which is equivalent to solving a suitable
coupled forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDE) system, see [11, Lemma 5.1, Theorem
5.2] and [30, Theorem 3.1], together with the discussion following the latter therein. Consequently, in both
of these works, individually optimal strategies are the best responses to this equilibrium price.
The model in [4] assumes that there are two markets where trading takes place, namely, the dealer and
open ones. In the latter, the transaction price of each player consists of a martingale (expected future
dividend payments) plus some liquidity costs stemming from permanent and temporary price impacts. In
this market, traders accommodate to a Nash equilibrium, for which closed-form formulas are at hand. In
the former, from the open market’s resulting behavior, the price is determined by the previously described
equilibrium methodology.
Another line of research related to differential games of optimal trading is the one that employs Mean-
Field Game (MFG) models. MFGs constitute a branch of game theory developed to study the behavior of
large populations of competing rational players. On many occasions, they are useful precisely because the
finite population counterpart is not quite tractable. They were introduced in the mathematical community
independently by J-M. Lasry and P-L. Lions [41, 42, 43], and by M. Huang, P. Caines and R. Malhame´
[36, 37].
Here, we refer to the works [15, 18, 28, 29, 30, 38]. The authors of [30] have to work with the MFG limit,
since the market clearing condition at the finite population level is incompatible with their adaptability
assumption on the given price. In this way, they must investigate this condition asymptotically. In [18, 28,
30, 38], authors analyze the MFG model and show that the agent’s best response to the optimal aggregate
rate is an approximate Nash equilibrium in the finite population game.
We also mention some advances related to settings of asymmetric information. The MFGs in [28, 29, 30]
have a common noise component, and allow the presence of private information. Differing beliefs between
sub-populations of traders is a feature analyzed in [19]. Authors in [6] propose a finite population game in
which the drift is a latent process, and there is a temporary price impact, but their goal is to investigate
mini-flash crashes. Other references considering latent factors are [9, 18, 25]. Equilibrium prices in the
setting of finite population models with players having private information, which they bring into the game
through their trading targets, is studied in [20].
On the more technical side, we refer to the recent results in [22] regarding convergences of MFGs of
controls and approximate Nash equilibria of the corresponding finite population counterparts, in both di-
rections, considering solutions of the former in a proper sense. Proving the convergence of unconstrained
games to constrained ones via monotonicity arguments is developed in [3, 32, 39, 40, 48]. There is an al-
ternative method which consists in identifying the precise asymptotic behavior of the candidate solution at
the terminal time, see [31, 33]. In [7], there is an analysis of stochastic Stackelberg differential games within
symmetric information framework and Brownian filtrations.
Main contributions. Our basic model generalizes the finite population one described at the beginning
of [28, Subsection 1.2], which in turn is motivated by [15, 16]. In contradistinction to those, we do not
assume that martingales driving the asset’s price are arithmetic Brownian motions, and we also allow for
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the presence of an uncertain drift. On the one hand, as opposed to the previously mentioned finite population
trading games, e.g., [4, 11], we allow all parameters to be stochastic, with mild assumptions. On the other
hand, we also provide new results in the settings in which parameters are constant. In comparison with
[28, 29, 30], our assumptions on informational asymmetry are more lenient. In effect, in most of the paper,
we solely assume that the filtrations satisfy the usual conditions. The extension to the leader-follower setting
builds upon [29, 38].
We divide the present work into three parts. Firstly, we consider the unconstrained setting. That is
a context in which players will not necessarily execute their total inventory by terminal time. However,
they penalize strategies reaching terminal time with a non-zero amount of shares. We characterize the
Nash equilibrium (NE) as the solution of a coupled FBSDE system of the McKean-Vlasov type. We prove
that, under a weak interaction assumption, akin to that made in [28, 35], this FBSDE admits a unique
solution. The condition we stipulate is equivalent to the one made in [28], provided that the population size
is sufficiently large. We use a continuation technique developed in [47].
Under the assumption of constant parameters, but still heterogeneous, we prove that the NE rates,
together with their corresponding inventories, form a solution of an ordinary differential equations (ODE)
system. We demonstrate that, still under weak interaction, this ODE has a unique solution. Furthermore,
we derive it in a semi-explicit form. If we further assume that parameters are homogeneous throughout
the population, we show that the average inventory solves a second-order scalar ODE, akin to its MFG
counterpart, derived in [15]. For this ODE system, closed-form formulas are available.
Secondly, we analyze the constrained problem, in which we require strict liquidation for all players. We
prove that a similar characterization of the NE holds in this circumstance. Assuming weakly interacting
agents, we manage to prove boundedness on the players’ strategies uniformly on the terminal penalization
parameters. We demonstrate that the whole net converges weakly in a suitable Hilbertian space and that
this limit solves the FBSDE; hence, it is a NE for the constrained problem. Putting ourselves under the
same framework of [28], which studies the MFG counterpart of our model, we prove that the average of the
rates forming the NE converges to the optimal mean-field aggregation rate, as the population size tends to
infinity. We also provide a convergence rate.
Thirdly, we develop an extension of our previous model to a hierarchical market. We assume there is a
leader and a population of followers. We analyze a setting which generalizes that serving as motivation to the
MFGs treated in [29, 38]. In our model, we assume that information is entirely asymmetric. Furthermore,
we need not assume the leader’s strategy and parameters’ adaptedness to the follower’s filtrations. In [29],
authors consider followers as informed traders, whereas [38] assumes no informational asymmetry.
We introduce hierarchy by stipulating that the leader has a first-mover advantage. Therefore, the natural
equilibrium to seek is that of Stackelberg-Nash. Thus, for each leader strategy, followers accommodate to a
NE. In a second moment, the leader player solves an optimization problem, conditional on minors following
the corresponding NE. We prove that there exists a unique Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium, for given initial
data, and characterize it by an FBSDE system consisting of the one identified in the previous part coupled
with adequate adjoint states. If we assume that parameters are constant and homogeneous among the
followers’ population, we render this resulting FBSDE as a second-order three dimensional ODE system.
Outline of the paper. We finish this Introduction by fixing the notations we use throughout the paper.
In Section 2, we describe our model, stipulate standing assumptions, and pose the equilibria problems we will
investigate. We analyze the NE of the unconstrained problem in Section 3, proving existence and uniqueness.
We also provide, in this Section, specialized results in the context of constant parameters. Next, in Section
4, we obtain the NE of the constrained problem as an asymptotic weak limit of unconstrained NE, and
relate the finite population game with its MFG counterpart. In Section 5, we extend our previous model to
a hierarchic game of optimal trader, with a single major agent and a finite population of minor ones. We
make concluding remarks in Section 6.
Notations. We consider a fixed time horizon T > 0, a population size N > 1, and a complete filtered
probability space
(
Ω,F ,F = {Ft}06t6T ,P
)
, where F satisfies the usual conditions and FT ⊆ F . We write
N := {1, ..., N}, and we assume that, to each i ∈ N , there corresponds a filtration Fi = {F it}06t6T , also
satisfying the usual conditions, and such that F it ⊆ Ft, for every t ∈ [0, T ] .
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From now on, G represents an arbitrary σ−algebra contained in F . We will consider the following
functional spaces:
L2 (Ω,G) := {X : X is G −measurable and E [X2] <∞} ;
L2 :=
{
x = {xt}06t6T : x is F− progressively measurable, and E
[∫ T
0
x2t dt
]
<∞
}
;
S :=
{
x = {xt}06t6T ∈ L2 : E
[
sup
06t6T
x2t
]
<∞
}
;
Mi :=
{
M = {Mt}06t6T : Mt ∈ L2
(
Ω,F it
)
, for a.e. t ∈ [0, T ] , and {Mt,F it}06t6T is a martingale}.
We emphasize that we consider all the expectations appearing above under the measure P.
These spaces are endowed with the norms
‖X‖L2(Ω,G) := E
[
X2
]1/2
,
‖x‖L2 := E
[∫ T
0
x2t dt
]1/2
,
‖y‖S := E
[
sup
06t6T
y2t
]1/2
,
and
‖M‖Mi := E [〈M〉T ]1/2 .
for each X ∈ L2 (Ω,G) , x ∈ L2, y ∈ S and M ∈ Mi, i ∈ N . For simplicity, we write from now on ‖ · ‖ :=
‖ · ‖L2 . We clarify that the norms above are well-defined because we do not distinguish processes equal
dt × dP−a.e.a.s. We abbreviated the expressions “almost everywhere” and “almost surely” by “a.e.” and
“a.s.,” respectively. We will do this from now on. Similarly, we do not make a difference in random variables
that coincide P−a.s. If there is a version of a stochastic process with continuous paths, then this is the one
we fix.
In general, throughout this work, given m > 1 normed spaces E1, ..., Em, we will consider in the product
space E := Πmi=1Ei the norm
‖x‖E :=
(‖x1‖2E1 + · · ·+ ‖xm‖2Em)1/2 ,
for x = (x1, ..., xm)
ᵀ ∈ E. For instance, we set
M(N) := ΠNi=1Mi.
With a slight abuse of notation, we will also denote the norm of
(
L2
)N
by ‖ · ‖.
For t ∈ [0, T ] , we denote by Pit the L2 (Ω,F)−projection operator onto L2
(
Ω,F it
)
, i.e.,
Pit (X) = E
[
X|F it
] (
X ∈ L2 (Ω,F)) .
We also set Pt : L2 (Ω,F)N → ΠNi=1L2
(
Ω,F it
)
to be
Pt (X) :=
(P1t (X1) , ...,PNt (XN))ᵀ ,
for X =
(
X1, ..., XN
)ᵀ
.
We finish this section fixing some general notations and terminologies we assume to be valid throughout
this whole work:
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• We convention that the letter C will denote a generic positive constant, depending only on model
parameters, which may change within estimates from line to line;
• For d > 1 and a matrix Λ ∈ Rd×d, we will write Λ = (`ij)i,j to express that `ij is the entry (i, j) of it.
• We employ the notation diag (`i) := (δij`i)i,j for diagonal matrices, where `1, ..., `d are given real
numbers, and δij denotes the Kronecker delta. We will particularly denote the square matrix of order
d, all of whose entries are equal to zero, by 0d×d. We write Id×d to denote the identity matrix of order
d;
• For two square matrices of the same order, Λ1 and Λ2, we write Λ1 > Λ2 to signify that Λ1 −Λ2 is
positive definite (not necessarily in the strict sense);
• For a given vector a = (a1, ..., aN)ᵀ , we put
a−i :=
(
a1, ..., ai−1, ai+1, ..., aN
)ᵀ
,
and (
ai,a−i
)
:= a,
for each i ∈ N ;
• For two vectors x,y ∈ Rd, we write x · y := xᵀy;
• We will only consider strong solutions of the stochastic differential equations (SDE), backward stochas-
tic differential equations (BSDE), as well as of the FBSDE appearing in this text. We always under-
stand solutions of an ODE system in the classical sense, except if we explicitly state otherwise.
2. The market model
Let us consider a stochastic differential game model comprising N competitive rational traders negoti-
ating a single financial asset. We index the players by i ∈ N . We will use the words trader, player or agent,
interchangeably henceforth. Agent i ∈ N controls her trading rate {νit}06t6T ∈ Ai, where
Ai :=
{
ν ∈ L2 : ν is Fi − progressively measurable}
is the admissible set of trading strategies for this player. We write
A(N) := ΠNj=1Aj and A−i := Πj 6=iAj .
Similarly, we consider
Si := S ∩ Ai and S(N) := ΠNi=1Si.
We endow each of the spaces Si with the restriction of the norm of S to it.
Each player i ∈ N has a corresponding inventory process {qit}06t6T ∈ Ai and a cash process {xit}06t6T ∈
Ai. We assume that the initial inventory qi0, as well as the initial cash amount xi0, belong to L2(Ω,F i0).
Dynamics of the state variables. Let us fix i ∈ N arbitrarily. The inventory {qit}06t6T of the agent
i evolves according to
dqit = ν
i
t dt. (2.1)
Let us denote the price from the perspective of player i by {sit}06t6T ; we stipulate that it is given by
dsit = µ
i
t dt+ α
i
tE
 1
N
N∑
j=1
νjt
∣∣∣∣∣F it
 dt+ dP it , (2.2)
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where P it ∈Mi, and
{
αit
}
06t6T is the permanent price impact parameter.
Several remarks are in order. We observe that, even if Fi = Fj , i 6= j, we do not necessarily require that
µi = µj , or αi = αj , or P i = P j . We can interpret this as distinct beliefs between agents i and j.
Alternatively, we can think that there exist correct, although uncertain, market parameters α and µ, i.e.,
which are F−progressively measurable, but not necessarily Fi−progressively measurable. In this context, it
is natural to consider that trader i utilizes αit = E
[
αt|F it
]
and µit = E
[
µt|F it
]
, akin to models with latent
processes, see [6, 9, 18, 25]. If we were to assume this, then there is no difference in agents’ beliefs having
the same level of information.
We also emphasize that, for j 6= i, the strategy νj of trader j need not be Fi−adapted; hence, the average
1
N
N∑
j=1
νj
is not necessarily Fi−adapted, whence we assume that player i projects it in the way we describe in (2.2).
Since she also undergoes a temporary price impact, usually modeled to be proportional to her trading
rate through a stochastic coefficient
{
κit
}
06t6T , we assume that her transaction price per share is
ŝit = s
i
t + κ
i
tν
i
t .
In this way, her cash process xi has the dynamics
dxit = −ŝitνit dt. (2.3)
We proceed to describe the general assumptions that we require to be valid throughout this work.
Standing assumptions. Let us maintain i ∈ N fixed. Henceforth, we consider stochastic processes{
αit
}
06t6T ,
{
κit
}
06t6T ,
{
µit
}
06t6T and
{
λit
}
06t6T , all of which are F
i−progressively measurable, satisfying
the following conditions:
A1 There exist positive constants αi, κi, λi, αi, κi and λ
i
such that
αi 6 αit 6 αi, κi 6 κit 6 κit and λi 6 λit 6 λ
i
,
for dt× dP−a.e.a.s.;
A2 The drift
{
µit
}
06t6T belongs to L
2;
A3 The processes
{
αit
}
06t6T are semimartingales of the form
dαit = β
i
t dt+ dM
αi
t ,
where
{
βit
}
06t6T is an essentially bounded process, uniformly on time, and M
αi ∈Mi.
The following quantities will figure in the estimates of some of this paper’s main results: for each real
number u, we set 
c1(u) := mini∈N inf06t6T
(
1
2κit
− u2
8(κit)
2
)
and c2(u) := mini∈N inf06t6T
(
2λit − 1N βit −
(αit)
2
2 u
2
)
.
(2.4)
We also write, from now on,
κ := min
i∈N
κi, κ := max
i∈N
κi, α := min
i∈N
αi, α := max
i∈N
αi, λ := min
i∈N
λi, λ := max
i∈N
λ
i
,
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as well as
β
i
:= sup
t∈[0,T ]
ess sup
∣∣βit∣∣ and β := max
i∈N
β
i
.
The dynamic assumption we made on the parameter αi holds if it is of the form
αit = f (Y t) (t ∈ [0, T ]) ,
where:
• For some d > 1, the function f : Rd → R is strictly positive, has essentially bounded weak derivatives
up to order two (i.e., f ∈W 2,∞ (Rd)), and ∇f has compact support;
• The d−dimensional factor Y satisfies
dY t = β
Y
t dt+ dM
Y
t ;
• The drift
{
βYt
}
06t6T
is an Fi−progressively measurable stochastic process, and
{
βYt I{Y t∈spt(∇f)}
}
06t6T
is essentially bounded;
• The martingale MY ∈Mi is such that
{〈
MY
〉
t
I{Y t∈spt(∇f)}
}
06t6T
is essentially bounded.
Above, IS denotes the indicator function of a set S. A particular instance of this class is, e.g., when we take
Y to be a one-dimensional Ornstein-Uhlenbeck or Cox-Ingersoll-Ross process, and f(y) =
(
αi ∨ y) ∧ αi,
0 < αi < αi.
Optimization criteria. Let us assume that the agent i benchmarks her terminal performance by her
initial wealth marked-to-market, i.e., xi0 + q
i
0s
i
0, and utilizes a quadratic penalty for holding inventory or
ending up with it:
Ji(ν
i;ν−i) = E
[
xiT + q
i
T s
i
T −
∫ T
0
λit
(
qit
)2
dt−Ai (qiT )2 − (xi0 + qi0si0)
]
= E
[∫ T
0
−κit (νit)2 − λit (qit)2 + αitqitN
N∑
j=1
νjt + q
i
tµt
 dt−Ai(qiT )2
]
.
(2.5)
For strategy profiles ν ∈ A(N), the functional Ji is well-defined by A1 and A2. The parameter Ai > 0 is
a preference of player i, and it represents her terminal inventory penalization. Regarding λi, we can think
that λit =
1
2γ
i
(
σit
)2
, where
(
σit
)2
is the price’s variance from the perspective of the corresponding trader.
The constant γi here stands for the risk aversion level of the trader, akin to the mean-variance modeling,
see [2] (cf. Equations (4), (5) and (15) therein), or to a constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) setting, see
[17, Chapter 6] or [34, Chapter 3].
Let us remark that, although players aim to finish with zero inventory, their initial holdings need not
be positive. Thus, if trader i is such that qi0 6 0 (respectively, qi0 > 0), then she is targeting to acquire
(respectively, liquidate)
∣∣qi0∣∣ shares of the asset. If an agent begins with qi0 ≡ 0, then she will carry out an
arbitrage program.
Nash Equilibria Our objective is to investigate Nash equilibria determined by the set of functionals
{J1, ..., JN} in terms of the following definition.
Definition 2.1 (The unconstrained setting). We say that a set of admissible strategy profiles ν∗ =
(
ν∗1, · · · , ν∗N)ᵀ ∈
A(N) is a Nash equilibrium for the unconstrained game if, for each i ∈ N ,
ν∗i = argmaxνi∈Ai Ji
(
νi;ν∗−i
)
. (2.6)
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We will also consider equilibria in the constrained setting, i.e., in the framework in which all players
demand full execution by terminal time. We introduce the constrained admissible control set
Ac,i :=
{
νi ∈ Ai :
∫ T
0
νit dt = −qi0, P− a.s.
}
(i ∈ N ).
Moreover, we set
Ac,−i := Πj 6=iAc,j ,
A0c,i :=
{
νi ∈ Ai :
∫ T
0
νit dt = 0, P− a.s.
}
,
for i ∈ N , and
Ac,(N) := ΠNj=1Ac,j ,
as well as
A0c,(N) := Π
N
j=1A0c,j .
Definition 2.2 (The constrained setting). A Nash equilibrium for the constrained problem is a stochastic
process ν∗ =
(
ν∗1, · · · , ν∗N)ᵀ ∈ Ac,(N) such that
ν∗i = argmaxνi∈Ac,i Ji
(
νi;ν∗−i
)
, (2.7)
for each i ∈ N .
3. Analysis of the N−player game: the unconstrained setting
3.1. The general unconstrained setting
We base our approach here on the variational formulation. It allows us to characterize the speeds of
trading comprising the Nash equilibrium, alongside their corresponding inventories, as the solution of an
FBSDE system. We develop this below. Our starting point is a lemma.
Lemma 3.1. Let us assume the following conditions
λi >
β
i
2N
and Ai >
αi
2N
,
for every i ∈ N . Then, given i ∈ N and ν−i ∈ A−i, the functional wi 7→ Ji(wi;ν−i) is strictly concave.
Proof. Let us fix wi, w˜i ∈ Ai, ν−i ∈ A−i, 0 6 θ 6 1. Denote by qi and q˜i the corresponding inventory
processes associated with wi and w˜i, respectively. We have
Ji(θw
i + (1− θ)w˜i;ν−i)− θJi(wi;ν−i)− (1− θ)Ji(w˜i;ν−i)
= θ(1− θ)E
[ ∫ T
0
{
κit
(
wit − w˜it
)2
+ λit
(
qit − q˜it
)2 − αit
N
(
qit − q˜it
) (
wit − w˜it
)}
dt+Ai
(
qiT − q˜iT
)2 ]
= θ(1− θ)E
[ ∫ T
0
{
κit
(
wit − w˜it
)2
+
(
λit +
βit
2N
)(
qit − q˜it
)2}
dt+
(
Ai − α
i
T
2N
)(
qiT − q˜iT
)2 ]
> 0,
with equality holding above if, and only if, wi = w˜i. This argument shows the strict concavity of wi 7→
Ji(w
i,ν−i).
The following definition will be of great technical importance from now on.
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Definition 3.2. Given i ∈ N , ν ∈ A(N), and wi ∈ Ai, the i−th partial Gaˆteaux derivative of Ji in the point
ν, in the direction wi, is defined as〈
DiJi(ν
i;ν−i), wi
〉
:= lim
→0
Ji(ν
i + wi,ν−i)− Ji(νi,ν−i)

. (3.1)
Lemma 3.3. The Gaˆteaux derivative (3.1) is well-defined for each i ∈ N , ν ∈ A(N), and wi ∈ Ai.
Proof. Let us write
Ji(ν
i + wi,ν−i)− Ji(νi,ν−i)

= I1 + I

2 + I

3 + I

4 + I

5 + I

6,
where 
I1 := −E
[∫ T
0
κit
{
(νi+wit)
2−(νit)
2

}
dt
]
,
I2 := −E
[∫ T
0
λit
{
(qi+
∫ t
0
wiu du)
2−(qit)
2

}
dt
]
,
I3 :=
1
NE
[∫ T
0
αit
{(
qit + 
∫ t
0
wiu du
) (
νit + w
i
t
)− qitνit} dt] ,
I4 :=
1
NE
[∫ T
0
αit
{(
qit + 
∫ t
0
wiu du
)∑
j 6=i ν
j
t − qit
∑
j 6=i ν
j
t
}
dt
]
,
I5 :=
1
E
[∫ T
0
{(
qit + 
∫ t
0
wiu du
)
µit − qitµit
}
dt
]
,
I6 := −E
[
Ai
{
(qiT+
∫ T
0
wit dt)
2−(qiT )
2

}]
.
We notice that
I1 = −E
[∫ T
0
2κitw
i
tν
i
t dt
]
+ ‖wi‖20 →0−−−→ −E
[∫ T
0
2κitw
i
tν
i
t dt
]
. (3.2)
Similarly, since
{∫ t
0
wiu du
}
06t6T
∈ L2, we prove that
lim
→0
I2 = −E
[∫ T
0
2λtq
i
t
∫ t
0
wiu du dt
]
, (3.3)
lim
→0
I3 = E
[∫ T
0
αit
N
(
νit
∫ t
0
wiu du+ q
i
tw
i
t
)
dt
]
, (3.4)
lim
→0
I4 = E
∫ T
0
αit
N
∑
j 6=i
νjt
∫ t
0
wiu du dt
 , (3.5)
lim
→0
I5 = E
[∫ T
0
µit
∫ t
0
wiu du dt
]
, (3.6)
and
lim
→0
I6 = E
[
−2AiqiT
∫ T
0
wit dt
]
. (3.7)
Gathering (3.2)-(3.6) together, and integrating by parts when necessary, we deduce that the limit in the
right-hand side of (3.1) exists and is equal to〈
DiJi
(
νi;ν−i
)
, wi
〉
= E
[∫ T
0
wit
{
− 2κitνit − 2
∫ T
t
λiuq
i
u du+
αit
N
qit
+
∫ T
t
αiu
N
N∑
j=1
νju du+
∫ T
t
µiu du− 2AiqiT
}
dt
]
.
(3.8)
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Corollary 3.4. Let us suppose that the assumptions of Lemma 3.1 hold. We consider i ∈ N and ν−i ∈ A−i.
A strategy ν∗i ∈ Ai solves the optimization problem
ν∗i = argmaxνi∈Ai Ji
(
νi;ν−i
)
(3.9)
if, and only if, 〈
DiJi
(
ν∗i;ν−i
)
, wi
〉
= 0, (3.10)
for all wi ∈ Ai. Consequently, ν∗i must solve
2κitν
∗i
t = x
∗i
t ,
dq∗it =
x∗it
2κit
dt,
−dx∗it = −2λitq∗it dt+ E
[
αit
N
∑
j 6=i ν
j
t
∣∣∣F it] dt− q∗itN βit dt+ µit dt− dM∗it ,
−x∗iT =
(
2Ai − αiTN
)
q∗iT ,
(3.11)
for some M∗i ∈Mi.
Proof. The first part is standard, see [45, Theorem 1.3] or item (a) of the proof of [23, Chapter II, Proposition
2.1]. To demonstrate the other half, we rewrite (3.8), with the aid of the tower property of conditional
expectations, in the following manner:
〈DiJi
(
νi;ν−i
)
, wi〉 = E
[∫ T
0
wit
{
− xit + 2
∫ t
0
λiuq
i
u du+
αit
N
qit −
1
N
∫ t
0
αiu
2κiu
xiu du
−
∫ t
0
E
αiu
N
∑
j 6=i
νju
∣∣∣∣∣F iu
 du− ∫ t
0
µiu du+M
i
t
}
dt
]
.
(3.12)
where xi = 2κitν
i
t and
M it :=E
∫ T
0
−2λiuqiu + 1N αiu2κiuxiu + α
i
u
N
∑
j 6=i
νju + µ
i
u
 du− 2AiqiT
∣∣∣∣∣F it

−
∫ t
0
E
αiu
N
∑
j 6=i
νju
∣∣∣∣∣F it
− E
αiu
N
∑
j 6=i
νju
∣∣∣∣∣F iu
 du.
We emphasize that M i belongs to Mi. We observe that (3.10) must be valid for every wi ∈ L2 when
νi = ν∗i. Therefore, we conclude that ν∗i solves (3.9) if, and only if, there exists M∗i ∈ Mi such that
(q∗i, x∗i = 2κiν∗i,M∗i) is a solution of the FBSDE (3.11).
From Corollary 3.4, we obtain the subsequent characterization of Nash equilibria in the present context.
Corollary 3.5. Under the assumptions of Lemma 3.1, a strategy ν∗ is a Nash equilibrium if, and only if,
it solves the FBSDE 
x∗t = Ktν
∗
t ,
dq∗t = K
−1
t x
∗
t dt,
−dx∗t = Pt (Ctx∗t ) dt−Σtq∗t dt+ 1Nβtq∗t dt+ µt dt− dM∗t ,
q∗0 = q0 and − x∗T = DTq∗T ,
(3.13)
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where M∗ ∈M(N) and the stochastic matrix coefficients are given by
Kt := diag
(
2κit
)
,
Ct :=
(
(1− δij) α
i
t
2Nκjt
)
ij
,
Σt := diag
(
2λit
)
,
βt := diag
(
βit
)
,
µt :=
(
µ1t , ..., µ
N
)ᵀ
,
and Dt := diag
(
2Ai − αitN
)
.
Theorem 3.6. Let us assume that the model parameters satisfy
α2 < 16κ
(
λ− 1
2N
β
)
and
D := min
i∈N
(
2Ai − α
i
N
)
> 0.
Then, the FBSDE (3.13) admits a unique solution (q∗,x∗,M∗) ∈ S(N) × S(N) ×M(N).
Remark 3.7. If a constant θ satisfies
α2
4
(
λ− 12N β
) < θ < 4κ,
then taking a :=
√
θ yields c1 := c1(a) > 0 and c2 := c2(1/a) > 0 (c.f. (2.4)).
Proof. We will demonstrate this Theorem with a continuation method developed in [47]. Our approach is
similar to that of [30, Theorem 4.2].
Let us consider the set I of all ρ ∈ [0, 1[ for which the FBSDE
dqρt = ρK
−1
t x
ρ
t dt+ f t dt,
−dxρt = − (1− ρ) qρt + ρ
(Pt (Ctxρt )−Σtqρt + 1Nβtqρt ) dt+ ρµt + gt dt− dMρt ,
qρ0 = q0 and − xρT = (1− ρ) qρT + ρDTqρT + η,
(3.14)
has a unique solution (qρ,xρ,Mρ) , for any given f , g ∈ A(N) and η ∈ Πi=1L2(Ω,F iT ). It is immediate to
verify that 0 ∈ I.
We assume ρ ∈ I and prove that ρ+ ζ will still belong to I for sufficiently small ζ > 0. Indeed, for each
(q,x) , the current assumptions guarantee the existence of the solution (X,Q,M) of the FBSDE:
dQt = ρK
−1
t Xt dt+ ζK
−1
t xt dt+ f t dt,
−dXt = − (1− ρ)Qt dt+ ρ
(Pt (CtXt)−ΣtQt + 1NβtQt) dt
+ ζqt + ζ
(Pt (Ctxt)−Σtqt + 1Nβtqt) dt
+ (ρ+ ζ)µt + gt dt− dM t,
Q = q0 and −XT = (1− ρ)QT + ρDTQT + ζqT + ζDTqT + η.
(3.15)
We will prove that the mapping (q,x) 7→ (Q,X) is a contraction, as long as ζ > 0 is sufficiently small. In
effect, let (q,x) and (q′,x′) correspond to solutions (Q,X,M) and
(
Q′,X ′,M ′
)
, respectively. We write
∆Q := Q−Q′,
∆X := X −X ′,
and ∆M := M −M ′.
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On the one hand, using the Itoˆ’s product formula, we infer
E [∆QT ·∆XT ] = I1 + I2, (3.16)
where
I1 := E
[∫ T
0
{
ρ∆Xt ·K−1t ∆Xt − ρ∆Qt ·Pt (Ct∆Xt)
+ ∆Qt ·
[
(1− ρ) I + ρ
(
Σt − 1
N
βt
)]
∆Qt
}
dt
]
,
(3.17)
and
I2 := ζE
[∫ T
0
{
∆Xt ·K−1t ∆xt + ∆Qt ·
(
I + Σt − 1
N
βt
)
∆qt + ∆Qt ·Pt (Ct∆xt)
}
dt
]
. (3.18)
With the aid of Young’s inequality, the conditional version Jensen’s inequality, and the tower property
of conditional expectations, we obtain
|E[∆Qt ·Pt (Ct∆Xt)]| 6 E
[
a2
2
N∑
i=1
(
∆Xit
)2(
2κit
)2 + 12a2
N∑
i=1
(
αit
)2 (
∆Qit
)2]
, (3.19)
where we have written
∆Qt =
(
∆Q1t , ...,∆Q
N
t
)ᵀ
and ∆Xt =
(
∆X1t , ...,∆X
N
t
)ᵀ
.
Let us fix a, c1 and c2 as described in Remark 3.7. Therefore, we estimate
I1 > ρc1‖∆X‖2 + [(1− ρ) + ρc2] ‖∆Q‖2
> (1 ∧ c2) ‖∆Q‖2 ,
(3.20)
and also
|I2| 6 CζE
[∫ T
0
{|∆Xt| |∆xt|+ |∆Qt| (|∆xt|+ |∆qt|)} dt
]
. (3.21)
Altogether, from (3.16), (3.20) and (3.21) we deduce
E[∆QT ·∆XT ] > γ ‖∆Q‖2 − CζE
[∫ T
0
{|∆Xt| |∆xt|+ |∆Qt| (|∆xt|+ |∆qt|)} dt
]
. (3.22)
On the other hand, the terminal condition of ∆X gives
E[∆QT ·∆XT ] = −E[∆QT · [(1− ρ) ∆QT + ρDT∆QT + ζ∆qT + ζDT∆qT ]]
6 −c0‖∆QT ‖2L2(Ω,F)N + CζE [|∆QT | |∆qT |] ,
(3.23)
with c0 := 1 ∧D. Using Young’s inequality, and assuming ζ to be sufficiently small, (3.22) and (3.23) yield
‖∆QT ‖2L2(Ω,F)N + ‖∆Q‖2 6 Cζ‖∆X‖2 + CζE
[
|∆qT |2 +
∫ T
0
{
|∆qt|2 + |∆xt|2
}
dt
]
. (3.24)
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Regarding ∆Q,∆q and ∆x as inputs in the BSDE solved by ∆X, standard stability techniques (such
as, e.g., those developed in [50, Theorem 9.5] or [10, Proposition 2.2]), together with basic properties of
conditional expectations, allow us to infer
‖∆X‖2S(N) + ‖∆M‖2M(N) 6C
(
‖∆QT ‖2L2(Ω,F)N + ‖∆Q‖2
)
+ Cζ
(
‖∆qT ‖2L2(Ω,F)N + ‖∆q‖2 + ‖∆x‖2
)
6Cζ‖∆X‖2 + Cζ
(
‖∆qT ‖2L2(Ω,F)N + ‖∆q‖2 + ‖∆x‖2
)
6Cζ‖∆X‖2S(N) + Cζ
(
‖∆qT ‖2L2(Ω,F)N + ‖∆q‖2 + ‖∆x‖2
)
,
where we utilized (3.24) in the last inequality above. Assuming Cζ < 1/2, it follows that
‖∆X‖2S(N) + ‖∆M‖2M(N) 6 Cζ
(
‖∆qT ‖2L2(Ω,F)N + ‖∆q‖2 + ‖∆x‖2
)
. (3.25)
Employing in (3.25) standard ODE estimates for ∆Q, we likewise obtain
‖∆Q‖2S(N) 6 Cζ
(
‖∆qT ‖2L2(Ω,F)N + ‖∆q‖2 + ‖∆x‖2
)
. (3.26)
Therefore, we conclude from (3.25) and (3.26) that the mapping (q,x) 7→ (Q,X) is a contraction on the
space S(N) × S(N), as long as Cζ < 1.
We remark that, in the argument above, for a given ρ ∈ I, we only needed ζ > 0 to satisfy ρ + ζ 6 1
and Cζ < 1, for a certain constant C depending solely on model parameters (and not on ρ). Consequently,
sup I = 1. Let us take ρ∗ ∈ I with 1 − C−1 < ρ∗ < 1. Applying the above argument to ρ = ρ∗, we can
take ζ := 1− ρ∗ < C−1 and infer that there exists a solution for ρ = ρ∗ + ζ = 1 in place of ρ, finishing the
proof.
3.2. Constant model parameters
Throughout this subsection, let us assume that all model parameters are constant. In particular, β ≡ 0.
We introduce the matrix B as follows:
B :=
[
0N×N K−1
Σ −C
]
.
Lemma 3.8. Under the assumptions of Theorem 3.6, the Riccati ODE{
G˙ = Σ−CG−GK−1G,
G(T ) = −D, (3.27)
admits a solution G : [0, T ]→ RN×N , which is given by
G(t) = Y 2(t)Y 1(t)
−1, (3.28)
where Y (t) = (Y 1(t),Y 2(t))
ᵀ ∈ R2N×N is defined as
Y (t) = e−(T−t)B
[
IN×N
−D
]
(0 6 t 6 T ) .
Proof. We will apply [27, Theorem 2.3]. We state this result here for convenience. It assures that, if we can
find two matrices Z1,Z2 ∈ RN×N , with Z1 symmetric, such that
Z1 −Z2D −DᵀZ2 > 0N×N ,
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and for which the matrix
L :=
[
Z1B11 +Z2B21 Z1B12 +B
ᵀ
11Z2 +Z2B22
0N×N B12Z2
]
,
satisfies
L+Lᵀ 6 02N×2N ,
then the Riccati ODE (3.27) has a continuous solution G : [0, T ]→ RN×N , which is differentiable for t < T,
and the formula (3.28) holds.
We take Z1 = 0
N×N and Z2 = −IN×N . It is clear that
Z1 −Z2D −DᵀZ2 = 2D > 0N×N .
Moreover, since
L =
[ −Σ C
0N×N −K−1
]
,
we have
L+Lᵀ 6 − (c1 ∧ c2) I2N×2N 6 0,
where c1 and c2 are as in Remark 3.7.
Let us consider Π and Ψ as the solutions of the ODEs{
Π˙ = −ΠK−1G,
Π(0) = IN×N
and {
Ψ˙ = Ψ
(
K−1G+C
)
,
Ψ(0) = IN×N .
Theorem 3.9. Let us suppose that the assumptions of Theorem 3.6 are valid. Then, the Nash equilibrium
ν∗ and the corresponding inventory q∗ are both deterministic and admit the representation{
ν∗(t) = K−1g0(t) +K
−1G(t)q∗(t),
q∗(t) = Π(t)−1
(
q0 +
∫ t
0
Π(u)K−1g0(u) du
)
,
where
g0(t) = Ψ(t)
−1
∫ T
t
Ψ(u)µ du.
Proof. We write x∗ := Kν∗. It is straightforward to derive that q∗ defined as in the statement satisfies
q˙∗ = K−1x∗.
Moreover,
x˙∗ = g˙0 + G˙q
∗ +Gq˙∗
= g˙0 +GK
−1g0 +
(
G˙+GK−1G
)
q∗
= −Cg0 − µ+ (−CG+ Σ) q∗
= −Cx∗ + Σq∗ − µ.
We conclude that (q∗,x∗,0) ∈ S(N) × S(N) ×M(N) does indeed solve (3.13).
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We provide in Figures 1 and 2 some illustrations of the optimal trading game dynamics. In Tables 1
and 2, we describe the parameters we used. In the former, the first player has an initial inventory equal
to one, and the second one begins with no holdings. Alternatively, we can interpret that the agent 2 as an
arbitrageur, i.e., she has no initial target to execute, and is present in the market only to seize arbitrage
opportunities. We see that trader 2 takes advantage of the pressure exerted on the price by agent 1. An
analogous situation occurs with the player 5 in the game with five traders. In Figure 2, we showcase the
difference in the behavior of the agent 1. Although this trader has the same parameters and initial data in
the two settings, her strategy is not the same due to the interactions with the other ones.
i αi κi λi Ai qi0
1 5× 10−5 2.5× 10−5 5× 10−6 5× 10−1 1
2 5× 10−6 2.5× 10−6 5× 10−7 2× 10−2 0
Table 1: Parameters used in the 2−player game. We fix T = 10 and µ = 0.
i αi κi λi Ai qi0
1 5× 10−5 2.5× 10−5 5× 10−6 5× 10−1 1
2 3× 10−5 1.5× 10−5 7× 10−7 3× 10−1 7× 10−1
3 2× 10−5 10−5 5× 10−7 2× 10−1 5× 10−1
4 5× 10−6 2.5× 10−6 2× 10−8 10−2 0
5 10−5 5× 10−6 5× 10−7 10−1 −2× 10−1
Table 2: Parameters used in the 5−player game. We fix T = 10.
Figure 1: In the left panel, we present the inventories in the 2−player game. In the right one, the corresponding objects in a
population of 5 agents.
Figure 2: Comparison of the inventory of the first trader in the 2− and 5−player game.
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Now, let us suppose further that the parameters are homogeneous throughout the population. Under
this assumption, we drop the superscripts: αi ≡ α, βi ≡ β, κi ≡ κ, λi ≡ λ and Ai ≡ A. We also assume
µ ≡ 0.
We can find the analysis of the MFG model in this setting in [15]. From their results, we know that the
mean-field inventory E solves the ODE system{
2κE¨ + αE˙ − 2λE = 0,
E(0) = E0, κE˙(T ) +AE(T ) = 0,
(3.29)
for some given initial data E0. This system has a closed-form solution, see [15, Proposition 3.1], which we
write below in an alternative form:
Proposition 3.10. The solution E of (3.29) is given by
E(t) = E0
y(t)
y(0)
,
where
y(t) := −
(
r− +
A
κ
)
e−r
+(T−t)
2θ
+
(
r+ +
A
κ
)
e−r
−(T−t)
2θ
,
for the parameters
θ =
1
κ
√
κλ+
α2
16
and r± = − α
4κ
± θ.
In what regards the N−player game, we can obtain a characterization of
EN :=
1
N
N∑
i=1
q∗i (3.30)
as a solution of an ODE system very close to (3.29). Furthermore, we can derive a closed-form formula for
it. These two facts comprise the content of the next result.
Theorem 3.11. When we assume that all model parameters are constant, as well as homogeneous throughout
the population, and that model parameters satisfy the condition exposed in Lemma 3.1, the average inventory
holdings (3.30) in the N−player game solves the ODE system{
2κE¨N + α
(
1− 1N
)
E˙N − 2λEN = 0,
EN (0) =
1
N
∑N
i=1 q
i
0, κE
′
N (T ) +AEN (T ) =
α
2NEN (T ).
(3.31)
Furthermore, it is explicitly given by
EN (t) =
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
qi0
)
yN (t)
yN (0)
,
where
yN (t) := −
[
r−N +
1
κ
(
A− α
2N
)] e−r+N (T−t)
2θN
+
[
r+N +
1
κ
(
A− α
2N
)] e−r−N (T−t)
2θN
, (3.32)
for the parameters
θN :=
1
4κ
√
α2
(
1− 1
N
)2
+ 16λκ
and
r±N := −
α
4κ
(
1− 1
N
)
± θN .
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Proof. Let us write
FN :=
1
N
N∑
i=1
ν∗i.
We recall that, under the current assumptions, both EN and FN are deterministic. Moreover, system (3.13)
implies 
E˙N =
1
2κFN ,
F˙N =
α
2κ
(
1− 1N
)
FN + λEN ,
EN (0) =
1
N
∑N
i=1 q
i
0, −FN (T ) =
(
2A− αN
)
EN (T ).
(3.33)
We can easily see that system (3.33) is equivalent to (3.31). The proof of the explicit formula (3.32) can be
done as in [15, Proposition 3.1].
In Figure 3, with the parameters of Table 3, we illustrate the convergence of the N−player average
inventory holdings, under the NE dynamics, to the corresponding MFG studied in [15].
α κ λ A E0
10−5 10−5 10−7 10−1 1
Table 3: Parameters we used to compute EN and E. We took T = 10 and EN (0) = E(0) = E0.
Figure 3: Average inventories EN , N ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} , and the limiting mean-field one E.
4. Analysis of the N−player game: the constrained setting
4.1. Solving the constrained problem as an asymptotic limit
In what follows, we state an auxiliary result which we will use many times.
Lemma 4.1. A stochastic process M =
(
M1, ...,MN
)ᵀ ∈ A(N) satisfies
E
[∫ T
0
M t ·wt dt
]
= 0, for every w ∈ A0c,(N), (4.1)
if, and only if, M i ∈Mi, for each i ∈ N .
Proof. It is immediate that (4.1) is equivalent to the identities
E
[∫ T
0
M itw
i
t dt
]
= 0
(
i ∈ N , wi ∈ A0c,i
)
(4.2)
17
holding simultaneously. We can now proceed as in [5, Lemma 5.3], employing the Lebesgue Differentiation
Theorem [26, Theorem 3.21] instead of using right-continuity, to conclude that (4.2) is in turn equivalent to
M i ∈Mi, for each i ∈ N .
In our next result, we obtain a characterization of Nash equilibria for the constrained problem. Together
with the corresponding inventories, the NE solves an FBSDE system close to (3.13).
Proposition 4.2. Under the assumptions of Lemma 3.1, a strategy ν∗ is a Nash equilibrium of the con-
strained problem if, and only if, it solves the FBSDE
x∗t = Ktν
∗
t ,
dq∗t = K
−1
t x
∗
t dt,
−dx∗t = Pt (Ctx∗t ) dt−Σtq∗t dt+ 1Nβtq∗t dt+ µt dt− dM∗t ,
q∗0 = q0 and q
∗
T = 0,
(4.3)
for a suitable M∗ ∈M(N).
Proof. When we restrict the admissible strategies of player i to those in Ac,i, we still have νi+wi ∈ Ac,i, for
νi ∈ Ac,i and  ∈ R, as long as wi ∈ A0c,i. For each of these νi and wi, the corresponding Gaˆteaux derivative〈
DiJi
(
νi;ν−i
)
, wi
〉
exists. Proceeding as in the proof of Lemma 3.3, we deduce that it is given by
〈
DiJi
(
νi;ν−i
)
, wi
〉
= E
[∫ T
0
wit
{
− 2κitνit − 2
∫ T
t
λiuq
i
u du+
αit
N
qit du
+
∫ T
t
αiu
N
N∑
j=1
νju du+
∫ T
t
µu du
}
dt
]
.
(4.4)
Since Ji restricted to Π
N
j=1Ac,j remains strictly concave in the i−th direction, we can deduce, in the same
way as we proved Corollaries 3.4 and 3.5, that ν∗ ∈ Ac,i is a Nash equilibrium for the constrained problem
if, and only if, 〈
DiJi
(
ν∗i;ν∗−i
)
, wi
〉
= 0
(
wi ∈ A0c,i, i ∈ N
)
. (4.5)
With the aid of Lemma 4.1, we conclude that (4.5) is in turn equivalent to (q∗,x∗ := Kν∗,M∗) solving
(4.3), for some M∗ ∈M(N).
We aim to obtain the solution of the constrained problem as an asymptotic limit of the processes solving
the unconstrained one, relative to terminal penalty parameters tending to infinity. Our proof of this result
will rely on the fact that the system (4.3) has the property of uniqueness of solutions.
Lemma 4.3. Under the assumptions of Theorem 3.6, the system (4.3) admits at most one solution.
Proof. Let us assume (q,x,M) and
(
q′,x′,M ′
)
are two solutions of (4.3). We set (∆q,∆x,∆M) :=(
q − q′,x− x′,M −M ′) . Using Itoˆ’s formula and conducting estimates similar to those carried out in the
first part of the proof of Theorem 3.6, we obtain
E [∆qT ·∆xT −∆q0 ·∆x0] > c1‖∆x‖2 + c2‖∆q‖2.
Since ∆qT = 0 and, likewise, ∆q0 = 0, P−a.s., we conclude that ∆q ≡ 0 and ∆x ≡ 0, whence ∆M ≡ 0 as
well.
Theorem 4.4. Let us assume that
α2 < 4λκ and D > 0.
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For each A = (A1, ..., AN )ᵀ, we denote by νA the Nash equilibrium corresponding to these terminal penalty
coefficients, and by qA the corresponding inventories. Then, there exist ν∞ ∈ Ac,(N) and q∞ ∈ S(N) for
which
νA ⇀ ν∞ and qA ⇀ q∞,
weakly in the topology of A(N), as A → (∞, ...,∞)ᵀ . Furthermore, the strategy profile ν∞ is the Nash
equilibrium of the constrained problem.
Proof. Let us fix νTWAP,i ∈ Ac,i ⊆ Ai, i ∈ N , where
νTWAP,it := −
qi0
T
(0 6 t 6 T ) .
Optimality of νA gives
Ji
(
νA,i;νA,−i
)
> Ji
(
νTWAP,i;νA,−i
)
. (4.6)
On the one hand, it is straightforward to estimate
Ji(ν
TWAP,i;νA,−i) > −Ci ()− 
N
(
1− 1
N
)
E
∫ T
0
∑
j 6=i
(
νA,jt
)2
dt
 , (4.7)
for each i ∈ N and each  > 0, where
Ci () := E
[∫ T
0
{(
qi0
T
)2 [
κit +
(
λit +
(
αit
)2
4
)
(T − t)2 + α
i
t
N
(T − t)
]
− q
i
0
T
(T − t)µit
}
dt
]
.
On the other hand, for a > 0, we have
Ji(ν
A,i;νA,−i) 6 −E
[∫ T
0
{
κit
(
νA,it
)2
+
(
λit −
(
αit
)2
2a2
− 
)(
qA,it
)2}
dt
+Ai
(
qA,iT
)2 ]
+
a2
2N
E
∫ T
0
N∑
j=1
(
νA,jt
)2
dt
+ 1
4
‖µi‖2.
(4.8)
Synthesizing (4.6)-(4.8) upon summing them over i ∈ N , we deduce
E
[∫ T
0
N∑
i=1
{
κit −
a2
2
− 
(
1− 1
N
)2}(
νA,it
)2
dt
]
+ E
[∫ T
0
N∑
i=1
(
λit −
(
αit
)2
2a2
− 
)(
qA,it
)2
dt+
N∑
i=1
Ai
(
qA,iT
)2 ]
6
N∑
i=1
Ci () +
1
2
N∑
i=1
‖µi‖2 =: RN ().
(4.9)
We take a such that
α2
2λ
< a2 < 2κ,
we fix  > 0 sufficiently small, and we assume Ai > A > 0, for all i ∈ N , concluding from inequality (4.9)
what follows ∥∥νA∥∥2 + ∥∥qA∥∥2 +A∥∥qAT ∥∥2L2(Ω,F)N 6 CRN (), (4.10)
where C > 0 can be taken to be independent of A (and N).
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Let us pass to a subsequence Ak =
(
A1,k, ..., AN,k
)ᵀ → (∞, ...,∞)ᵀ such that
νA
k
⇀ ν∞, weakly in A(N),
qA
k
⇀ q∞, weakly in A(N),
qA
k
T → 0, strongly in L2 (Ω,F)N .
(4.11)
We claim (q∞,x∞ := Kν∞,M∞) solves (4.3), for some M∞ ∈M(N). In effect, the relation
d
dt
qA
k
= νA
k
, distributionally, for k > 1,
implies
d
dt
q∞ = ν∞ = K−1x∞, distributionally. (4.12)
Consequently, the paths t 7→ q∞t are absolutely continuous P−a.s., whence (4.12) holds P−a.s. for almost
every t ∈ [0, T ] , as well as q∞T = 0, P−a.s. (by the last convergence in (4.11)). Thus, the membership
ν∞ ∈ Ac,(N) holds.
Let us take the dot product of the BSDE part of (3.13) with a given w ∈ A0c,(N), and then integrate the
result over [0, T ]× Ω against dt× dP, from where it follows that
E
[∫ T
0
xA
k
t ·wt dt
]
= E
[∫ T
0
∫ T
t
[
Cux
Ak
u −
(
Σu − 1
N
βu
)
qA
k
u + µu
]
du ·wt dt
]
. (4.13)
Above, we employed Lemma 4.1 to ensure that
E
[∫ T
0
wt ·MA
k
t dt
]
= 0,
for all k > 1, and we also used the fact that
E
[∫ T
0
xA
k
T ·wt dt
]
= E
[
xA
k
T ·
∫ T
0
wt dt
]
= 0.
From the convergences in (4.11), we deduce
E
[∫ T
0
xA
k
t ·wt dt
]
→ E
[∫ T
0
x∞t ·wt dt
]
,
as k →∞. Also, applying Fubini’s Theorem and basic properties of the projections {Pi}
i∈N ,
E
[∫ T
0
∫ T
t
Pu
(
Cux
Ak
u
)
du ·wt dt
]
= E
[∫ T
0
νA
k
u ·Pu
((
CuK
−1
u
)ᵀ ∫ u
0
wt dt
)
du
]
−→ E
[∫ T
0
ν∞u ·Pu
((
CuK
−1
u
)ᵀ ∫ u
0
wt dt
)
du
]
= E
[∫ T
0
∫ T
t
Pu (Cux∞u ) du ·wt dt
]
,
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since
{
Pu
((
CuK
−1
u
)ᵀ ∫ u
0
wt dt
)}
06u6T
∈ A(N), and likewise,
E
[∫ T
0
∫ T
t
(
Σu − 1
N
βu
)
qA
k
u du ·wt dt
]
−→ E
[∫ T
0
∫ T
t
(
Σu − 1
N
βu
)
q∞u du ·wt dt
]
whence, passing (4.13) to the limit as k →∞, we obtain
E
[∫ T
0
M˜ t ·wt dt
]
= 0, (4.14)
where
M˜ t := x
∞
t −Pt
(∫ T
t
[
Pu (Cux∞u )−
(
Σu − 1
N
βu
)
q∞u + µu
]
du
)
= x∞t +
∫ t
0
[
Pu (Cux∞u )−
(
Σu − 1
N
βu
)
q∞u + µu
]
du−M ′t,
where we have written
M ′t := Pt
(∫ T
0
[
Pu (Cux∞u )−
(
Σu − 1
N
βu
)
q∞u + µu
]
du
)
.
Applying Lemma 4.1, we conclude that
(
q∞,x∞,M∞ := M˜ +M ′
)
solves the FBSDE (4.3).
We recall Lemma 4.3, which guarantees that (4.3) has at most one solution. This fact and the above
argument imply that the sets of weak accumulation points of the nets
{
νA
}
A
and
{
qA
}
A
are singletons.
Since they are both confined to a weakly compact subset of the Hilbert space A(N), namely, a suitable ball
(see [13, Theorem 3.17]), we conclude that the whole net must converge, and its limit must be the solution
of (4.3).
It is pertinent to register a further consequence of estimate (4.10):
Corollary 4.5. Under the assumptions of Theorem 4.4, the solution (q,ν,M) of (4.3) satisfies
‖ν‖2 + ‖q‖2 6 CRN (),
where RN is defined in (4.9), C and  are fixed positive constants depending only on α, κ, λ and
{∥∥µi∥∥}N
i=1
.
Proof. From the uniform boundedness principle (see [13, Proposition 3.5 (iii)]), alongside estimate (4.10)
mentioned above, we have
‖ν‖2 + ‖q‖2 6 lim inf
A→∞
(‖νA‖2 + ‖qA‖2) 6 CRN ().
4.2. Relating the constrained N−player game with the corresponding MFG
Let us assume hypotheses of Theorem 4.4 hold. We denote by
(
qN ,xN = KνN ,MN
)
the solution of
the FBSDE (4.3) corresponding to a population size N and µ ≡ 0. We devote this subsection to investigating
the convergence properties of the Nash equilibrium νN as N tends to infinity. Our first remark follows from
Corollary 4.5.
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Corollary 4.6. If
{
qi0
}
i>1 is L
2−bounded, and the assumptions of Theorem 4.4 are valid, then the Nash
equilibrium νN =
(
νN,1, ..., νN,N
)ᵀ
and corresponding inventory qN =
(
qN,1, ..., qN,N
)ᵀ
satisfy
sup
N
{
1
N
N∑
i=1
(∥∥νN,i∥∥2 + ∥∥qN,i∥∥2)} <∞.
For the remainder of the present section, we stipulate that the hypotheses of Theorem 4.4 are in force.
Moreover, we assume the following:
• The probability space (Ω,F ,P) supports standard independent Brownian motionsW ,W 0,W 1,W 2, ...,
where W 0 is d0−dimensional, and all others are d−dimensional, for two given integers d0, d > 1;
• Initial inventories {qi0}i>1 are independent and identically distributed;
• For each i ∈ N , the filtration Fi is the P−augmentation of the filtration generated by qi0, W 0 and W i;
• There exist measurable functions α, κ, λ and β such that
αit = α
(
qi0,W
0
·∧t,W
i
·∧t
)
, κit = κ
(
qi0,W
0
·∧t,W
i
·∧t
)
, λit = λ
(
qi0,W
0
·∧t,W
i
·∧t
)
and
βit = β
(
qi0,W
0
·∧t,W
i
·∧t
)
;
• The functions α, κ, λ and β satisfy
α 6 α 6 α, κ 6 κ 6 κ, λ 6 λ 6 λ and |β| 6 β;
• The constants κ, λ and α satisfy
α2 < 4λκ.
Let us also write F0 for the P−augmentation of the filtration generated by W 0, and likewise, we denote by F
the one obtained through this process from W 0,W and a square-integrable random variable q0 independent
of
{
qi0
}
i>1 , having the same distribution of these.
In this context, we put ourselves in the framework of [28], where the subsequent MFG is studied:
1. fix an F0 − progressively measurable process µ ∈ L2;
2. solve ξ∗ = argmaxξ E
[∫ T
0
{
αtµtqt − λt (qt)2 − κt (ξt)2
}
dt
]
,
where ξ ∈ L2 is F− progressively measurable, dqt = ξt dt, qT = 0;
3. search for a fixed point µ∗t = E
[
ξ∗t |F0t
]
, a.e.a.s.
In this work, the authors prove that the above problem is equivalent to solving the FBSDE system
dq∗t =
x∗t
2κt
dt,
−dx∗t = αtE
[
x∗t
2κt
∣∣∣F0t ] dt− 2λtq∗t dt−Z∗t · dW˜ t,
q∗0 = q0 and q
∗
T = 0,
(4.15)
with corresponding optimal aggregation effect
µ∗t = E
[
x∗t
2κt
∣∣∣F0t ] , (4.16)
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where we have written W˜ =
(
W 0,W
)
. We introduce the best response ξ∗,i of player i to the mean-field µ∗
described in (4.16) as in [28, Section 3], i.e.,
ξ∗,i = argmaxξi∈Ai E
[∫ T
0
{
αitµ
∗
t q
i
t − λit
(
qit
)2 − κit (ξit)2} dt
]
,
where qi is initiated at qi0, and is constrained to dq
i
t = ξ
i
t dt and q
i
T = 0. We proceed to list the most
important properties of the processes
{
ξ∗,i
}
i>1 for our present purposes.
Lemma 4.7. (a) For some Z∗,i ∈ Ai, the process
(
q∗,i, x∗,i = 2κiξ∗,i,Z∗,i
)
solves the FBSDE
dq∗,it =
x∗,it
2κit
dt,
−dx∗,it = αitµ∗t dt− 2λitq∗,it dt−Z∗,it · dW˜
i
t,
q∗,i0 = q0 and q
∗,i
T = 0,
where W˜
i
=
(
W 0,W i
)
.
(b) The relation
µ∗t = E
[
ξ∗,it
∣∣∣F0t ] , a.e.a.s.,
holds.
(c) The estimate ∥∥∥∥∥ 1N
N∑
i=1
ξ∗,i − µ∗
∥∥∥∥∥ = O
(
1√
N
)
is valid.
Proof. Item (a) is a particular case of the characterization of constrained Nash equilibria made in Proposition
4.2 (we remark that the lack of interaction in the objective functionals decouples the system). The result
of item (b) is established in [28, Section 3], and we can prove the estimate of (c) with the same iterated
conditioning and conditional independence arguments used in the proof of [28, Theorem 3.3] (c.f. equation
(3.5) therein).
With Lemma 4.7 at hand, we are ready to prove the main result of this subsection.
Theorem 4.8. The Nash equilibrium νN =
(
νN,1, ..., νN,N
)ᵀ
satisfies∥∥∥∥∥ 1N
N∑
i=1
ν∗,i − µ∗
∥∥∥∥∥ = O
(
1√
N
)
.
Proof. We notice that, under the current assumptions, the system (4.3) reads componentwise as
xN,it = 2κ
i
tν
N,i
t ,
dqN,it =
xN,it
2κit
dt,
−dxN,it = αitE
[
1
N
∑
j 6=i
xN,jt
2κjt
∣∣∣F0t ] dt− (2λit − 1N βit) qN,it dt−ZN,i · dW˜ it,
qN,i0 = q
i
0 and q
N,i
T = 0.
(4.17)
Using Lemma 4.7 (b), we see that it is licit to write
µ∗t = E
 1
N
N∑
j=1
ξ∗,jt
∣∣∣∣∣F0t
 ,
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in such a way that the optimality system that we have presented in Lemma 4.7 (a) becomes
x∗,it = 2κ
i
tξ
∗,i
t ,
dq∗,it =
x∗,it
2κit
dt,
−dx∗,it = αitE
[
1
N
∑N
j=1
x∗,jt
2κjt
∣∣∣F0t ] dt− 2λitq∗,it dt−Z∗,it · dW˜ it,
q∗,i0 = q0 and q
∗,i
T = 0.
(4.18)
Let us write
∆qN =
(
qN,1 − q∗,1, ..., qN,N − q∗,N)ᵀ
and
∆xN =
(
xN,1 − x∗,1, ..., xN,N − x∗,N)ᵀ .
Using Itoˆ’s formula, together with (4.17) and (4.18), and conducting estimates as in Theorem 3.6, we obtain
0 = E
[
∆qNT ·∆xNT −∆qN0 ·∆xN0
]
> c1‖∆xN‖2 + c2‖∆qN‖2 − C
N2
N∑
i=1
(∥∥xN,i∥∥2 + ∥∥qN,i∥∥2)
> c1‖∆xN‖2 + c2‖∆qN‖2 − C
N2
N∑
i=1
(∥∥νN,i∥∥2 + ∥∥qN,i∥∥2) ,
(4.19)
where the positive constants c1, c2 and C are independent of N. Taking into account Corollary 4.6, we infer
from estimate (4.19) that ∥∥∥∥∥ 1N
N∑
i=1
νN,i − 1
N
N∑
i=1
ξ∗,i
∥∥∥∥∥
2
6 C
N
∥∥∆xN∥∥2 6 C
N2
, (4.20)
the constant C > 0 being independent of N. We conclude the proof of the Theorem by combining (4.20)
with Lemma 4.7 (c).
5. An extension: the hierarchical game
5.1. Adding a major player to the game
Here, we assume that, in addition to the population of N individuals we described in Section 2, there is
a leading agent, which we call a leader, labeled by 0. The game we study is hierarchical in the sense that
this leader has a first-mover advantage. The members of the formerly described population are now called
followers. Thus, we look for a Stackelberg-Nash type strategy: it optimizes the leader’s performance criteria
subject to the condition that minor players are following a corresponding Nash equilibrium. Henceforth, we
work under the constrained framework, assuming that the hypotheses of Theorem 4.4 hold.
As the agent 0 changes her strategy, the main technical challenge is that the population of followers will
react to it. Therefore, we take a two-step approach. Firstly, we assume a leader’s turnover rate is given
and study the corresponding NE properties in which the population accommodates. Secondly, we insert
this equilibrium as a function of the strategy of trader 0 in the leader’s objective criterion, rendering the
problem into a single-player optimization.
We assume that the processes and parameters associated with the leader are all adapted to a given
filtration F0 satisfying the usual conditions. Thus, for a given q00 ∈ L2
(
Ω,F00
)
, we let Ac,0 be the set of
processes ν0 ∈ L2 that are F0−progressively measurable processes, and that satisfy∫ T
0
ν0t dt = −q00 , P− a.s..
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Similarly, we define A0c,0 just as Ac,0 but with the identically vanishing random variable in place of q00 . We
consider processes
{
α0t
}
06t6T ,
{
κ0t
}
06t6T and
{
λ0t
}
06t6T , alongside constants α
0, κ0, λ0, α0, κ0 and λ
0
,
such that
α0 6 α0 6 α0, κ0 6 κ0 6 κ0 and λ0 6 λ0 6 λ0.
The agent 0 trades at a rate
{
ν0t
}
06t6T ∈ Ac,0. In the leader’s viewpoint, the mid-price s0 has the
dynamics
ds0t = α
0
t ν
0
t dt+ αtE
 1
N
N∑
j=1
νjt dt
∣∣∣∣∣F0t
+ dP 0t ,
with
{
P 0t ,F0t
}
06t6T being a martingale. Her inventory and a cash process evolve as in (2.1) and (2.3),
namely,
dq0t = ν
0
t dt
and
dx0t = −
(
s0t + κ
0
tν
0
t
)
ν0t dt.
We particularize the model described in Section 2 by considering that the drift in (2.2) takes a particular
form, namely,
µit = E
[
α0t ν
0
t + ot|F it
]
(i ∈ N ), (5.1)
where {ot}06t6T ∈ L2 is exogenous background noise, see [38].
5.2. Step 1: Given a leader strategy, minor players accommodate to a Nash equilibrium
Throughout this section, we fix a process ν0 ∈ L2, which we assume to be F0−progressively measurable,
and also the background noise o ∈ L2. The corresponding Nash equilibrium ν∗ = (ν∗,1, ..., ν∗,N)ᵀ of the
followers is the unique solution of the FBSDE (4.3) with µi given by (5.1). Let us write
Kν∗ = y + b,
where 
dpt = K
−1
t yt dt,
−dyt = Pt (Ctyt) dt−
(
Σt − 1Nβt
)
pt dt+Pt
(
α0t ν
0
t 1N
)
dt− dM1t ,
p0 = 0 and pT = 0,
(5.2)
and 
dht = K
−1
t bt dt,
−dbt = Pt (Ctbt) dt−
(
Σt − 1Nβt
)
ht dt+Pt (ot1N ) dt− dM2t ,
h0 = q0 and hT = 0,
(5.3)
for suitable M1,M2 ∈M(N), where 1N denotes the N−dimensional vector having all entries equal to one.
Intuitively, we break ν in two pieces. The first one, K−1y, is a pure arbitrage component, whose all
entries are round-trip trades. It is through this that followers seek to seize price movements stemming from
the leader program. The second part, K−1b, concerns the complete execution of the initial portfolio by
time T while facing a background noise o.
We notice that the mapping T : ν0 7→ y is linear. It is also bounded, as we show next.
Proposition 5.1. The linear mapping T is bounded, with
‖T ‖op := sup
‖ν0‖=1
‖T ν0‖ 6 N1/2 2α
0 κ(
4λ− 2N β
)1/2
g
,
where g is the gap
g := 2
√
κ− α
(
4λ− 2
N
β
)−1/2
> 0.
25
Proof. It is straightforward to derive from the optimality conditions (4.5) that
E
[∫ T
0
{
− wityit − 2λitpit
∫ t
0
wiu du+
αit
N
N∑
j=1
yjt
2κjt
∫ t
0
wiu du+
αitp
i
t
N
wit + α
0
t ν
0
t
∫ t
0
wiu du
}
dt
]
= 0, (5.4)
for every i ∈ N and wi ∈ Ac,i. Let us take wi = yi/
(
2κi
)
as a test process in (5.4) and sum these equations
over i; we estimate, utilizing (2.4) and Young’s inequality with a,  > 0,
0 =
N∑
i=1
E
[∫ T
0
{
−
(
yit
)2
2κit
−
(
2λit −
1
N
βit
)(
pit
)2
+
αitp
i
t
N
N∑
j=1
yjt
2κjt
+ α0t ν
0
t p
i
t
}
dt
]
6 −c1(a)‖y‖2 − (c2(1/a)− ) ‖p‖2 +N
(
α0
)2
4
‖ν0‖2.
Upon fixing  = c2(1/a), we obtain
‖y‖2 6 N
(
α0
)2
4c1(a)c2(1/a)
‖ν0‖2. (5.5)
Since
c1(a) >
1
8κ2
(
4κ− a2) and c2(1/a) > 2λ− 1
N
β − α
2
2a2
,
we write B :=
(
4λ− 2N β
)−1
, obtaining from (5.5) that
‖y‖2 6 N 4
(
α0
)2
κ2Ba2
(4κ− a2) (a2 − α2B)‖ν0‖2. (5.6)
Upon taking a2 :=
√
4κα2B, we minimize the right-hand side of (5.6), from where the stated estimate
follows.
It will be convenient for us to introduce the notation
ν
(
ν0
)
:=
1
N
N∑
i=1
νi, (5.7)
where ν =
(
ν1, ..., νN
)ᵀ
= K−1T ν0 +K−1b is the Nash equilibrium of the followers corresponding to ν0.
Furthermore, let us write
Lν0 =
(
L1ν
0, ..., LNν
0
)ᵀ
:= K−1T ν0, (5.8)
where we regard K−1 as a standard multiplication operator,
X 7−→ {K−1t Xt}06t6T .
We also introduce the continuous linear mapping ν0 7→ Lν0 by
Lν0 =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Liν
0. (5.9)
From Proposition 5.1, we can estimate the norm of L uniformly in N.
Corollary 5.2. The following estimate for the operator norm of L holds:∥∥L∥∥
op
6 α
0 κ[
κ
(
2λ− 1N β
)]1/2
g
.
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Proof. It is straightforward to prove relation∥∥L∥∥2
op
6 1
2κN
‖T ‖2op .
This inequality, alongside Proposition 5.1, imply the result.
We conclude this subsection by investigating the adjoint operator of L. From (5.8) and (5.9), we see that
this issue is intricately related to the one corresponding to T , leading us to the following Lemma.
Lemma 5.3. Given g ∈ A0c,(N), let us assume that the FBSDE
−dϕt =
(
Σt − 1Nβt
)
ψt dt− dΓt,
dψt = −K−1t ϕt dt+Pt (Cᵀtψt) dt+ gt dt,
ψ0 = 0 and ψT = 0,
admits a solution (ϕ,ψ,Γ) ∈ A(N) × A(N) ×M(N). Then,
(T ∗g)t = α
0
tE
[
1
ᵀ
Nψt|F0t
]
(t ∈ [0, T ]) .
Proof. Let us consider
(
p,y,M1
)
as in (5.2). Using Itoˆ’s formula, we compute
0 = E
[
(pt ·ϕt + yt ·ψt) |t=Tt=0
]
= E
[∫ T
0
{−α0tE [1ᵀNψt|F0t ] ν0t + y · g} dt
]
,
whence the result follows.
With the aid of Lemma 5.3, we provide a useful description of L
∗
.
Proposition 5.4. Given g ∈ L2, let us assume that the FBSDE
−dϕt =
(
Σt − 1Nβt
)
ψt dt− dΓt,
dψt = −K−1t ϕt dt+Pt (Cᵀtψt) dt+Pt
(
1
N gtK
−1
t 1N
)
dt,
ψ0 = 0 and ψT = 0,
(5.10)
admits a solution (ϕ,ψ,Γ) ∈ A(N) × A(N) ×M(N). Then,(
L
∗
g
)
t
= α0tE
[
1
ᵀ
Nψt|F0t
]
(t ∈ [0, T ]) . (5.11)
Proof. For i ∈ N , we consider the canonical projection and injection, respectively:
pii : X = (X
1, ..., XN )ᵀ ∈ A(N) 7→ Xi ∈ L2;
ιi : X ∈ L2 7→
(
0, ..., 0,Pi (X) , 0, ..., 0)ᵀ ∈ A(N).
It is clear that (pii)
∗
= ιi. We notice that
L =
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
pii
)
L =
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
pii
)
K−1T .
Therefore,
L
∗
= T ∗K−1
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
ιi
)
, (5.12)
since K is symmetric. In view of Lemma 5.3, identity (5.12) implies (5.11).
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5.3. Step 2: The leader solves her optimization problem
Following the same ideas of (2.5), we define the performance criteria of the leader in the sequel.
Definition 5.5. The objective functional J0 : Ac,0 → R of player 0 is defined as
J0(ν
0) := E
[∫ T
0
{
−κ0t
(
ν0t
)2 − λ0t (q0t )2 + q0t [α0t ν0t + α0t ν (ν0)t + ot]} dt
]
.
Lemma 5.6. (a) Given ν0 ∈ Ac,0 and w0 ∈ A0c,0, the first order Gaˆteaux derivative〈
J ′0(ν
0), w0
〉
= lim
→0
J0
(
ν0 + w0
)− J0 (ν0)

exists.
(b) For ν0 and w0 as in (a), the second order Gaˆteaux derivative〈
J ′′0 (ν
0), (w0, w0)
〉
= lim
→0
1

〈
J ′0
(
ν0 + w0
)− J ′0 (ν0) , w0〉
exists and is independent of ν0. Consequently, for ν0, ν˜0 ∈ Ac,0, we have the identity
J0(ν
0) = J0(ν˜
0) +
〈
J ′0(ν˜
0), ν0 − ν˜0〉+ 1
2
〈
J ′′0 (ν˜
0),
(
ν0 − ν˜0, ν0 − ν˜0)〉 . (5.13)
(c) If (
α0
)2
< 2
(∥∥L∥∥2
op
+ 1
)−1
λ0 κ0, (5.14)
then there exists c > 0, depending only on model parameters, such that〈
J ′′0 (ν
0), (w0, w0)
〉
6 −c‖w0‖2. (5.15)
Remark 5.7. By Corollary 5.2, we notice that the norm of the operator L appearing in the weak interaction
assumption (5.14) made in (c) is uniformly bounded on the population size N. Therefore, this result is
meaningful even for large populations. Moreover, if we utilize in (5.14) the estimate provided in Corollary
5.2, we derive an explicit condition for the result to hold solely in terms of upper and lower bounds on the
model parameters.
Proof. (a) We can establish this item by proceeding just as we did in Lemma 3.3. In this way, we obtain
the formula〈
J ′(ν0), w0
〉
= E
[∫ T
0
{
− 2κ0tν0tw0t − 2λ0t q0t
∫ t
0
w0u du+
(
α0t ν
0
t + α
0
t ν
(
ν0
)
t
+ ot
) ∫ t
0
w0u du
+ q0t
[
α0tw
0
t + α
0
t
(
Lw0
)
t
]}
dt
]
= E
[∫ T
0
w0t
{
− 2κ0tν0t − 2
∫ T
t
λ0uq
0
u du+
∫ T
t
(
α0uν
0
u + α
0
uν
(
ν0
)
u
+ ou
)
du
+ α0t q
0
t +
(
L
∗ (
α0q0
))
t
}
dt
]
.
(5.16)
(b) We notice from (5.16) that, for each w0 ∈ A0c,0, the mapping ν0 7→
〈
J ′
(
ν0
)
, w0
〉
is linear and
continuous. Furthermore, we see that the second-order derivative does exists and equal to
〈
J ′′0
(
ν0
)
,
(
w0, w0
)〉
= E
[∫ T
0
{
− 2κ0t
(
w0
)2 − 2λ0t (∫ t
0
w0u du
)2
+ 2α0t
∫ t
0
w0u du
[
w0t +
(
Lw0
)
t
]}
dt
]
,
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which is independent of ν0. Given ν0, ν˜0 ∈ Ac,0, we have w0 := ν0 − ν˜0 ∈ A0c,0; hence, we can derive (5.13)
as follows:
J0(ν
0)− J0(ν˜0) =
∫ 1
0
〈
J ′0
(
θ1ν
0 + (1− θ1) ν˜0
)
, w0
〉
dθ1
=
〈
J ′0
(
ν˜0
)
, w0
〉
+
∫ 1
0
〈
J ′0
(
θ1ν
0 + (1− θ1) ν˜0
)− J ′0 (ν˜0) , w0〉 dθ1
=
〈
J ′0
(
ν˜0
)
, w0
〉
+
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
〈
J ′′0
(
θ1θ2ν
0 + (1− θ1θ2) ν˜0
)
,
(
w0, w0
)〉
θ1 dθ2 dθ1
=
〈
J ′0
(
ν˜0
)
, w0
〉
+
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
θ1 dθ2 dθ1
〈
J ′′0
(
ν˜0
)
,
(
w0, w0
)〉
=
〈
J ′0
(
ν˜0
)
, w0
〉
+
1
2
〈
J ′′0
(
ν˜0
)
,
(
w0, w0
)〉
.
(c) Employing Young’s inequality with a > 0, we infer
〈
J ′′0
(
ν0
)
,
(
w0, w0
) 〉
6 −
[
2κ0 − a2
(
1 +
∥∥L∥∥2
op
)] ∥∥w0∥∥2 − [2λ0 − 2 (α0)2
a2
]∥∥∥∥∫ ·
0
wu du
∥∥∥∥2 .
We take a subject to (
α0
)2
λ0
< a2 <
2κ0
1 +
∥∥L∥∥2
op
,
whence (5.15) follows.
Corollary 5.8. Let us assume that (5.14) is in force. Then, the functional J0 is strictly concave and
coercive.
Proof. We fix ν˜0 and notice that the mapping
ν0 7→ J0
(
ν˜0
)
+
〈
J ′0
(
ν˜0
)
, ν − ν˜0〉+ 1
2
〈
J ′′0
(
ν˜0
)
,
(
ν0 − ν˜0, ν0 − ν˜0)〉
is concave; hence, the concavity of J0 follows from its representation proved in Lemma 5.6 (b), whereas strict
concavity follows from Lemma 5.6 (c). Similarly, these results give
J0
(
ν0
)
6 J
(
ν˜0
)
+
∥∥J ′ (ν˜0)∥∥ ∥∥ν0 − ν˜0∥∥− c∥∥ν0 − ν˜0∥∥2 → −∞,
as
∥∥ν0∥∥→∞, where J ′ (ν˜0) is given by
J ′
(
ν˜0
)
t
= −2κ0t ν˜0t + α0t q˜0t + E
[
−2
∫ T
t
λ0uq˜
0
u du+
∫ T
t
(
α0uν˜
0
u + α
0
uν
(
ν˜0
)
u
+ ou
)
du+
(
L
∗ (
α0q˜0
))
t
∣∣∣∣F0t
]
,
if q˜0t = q
0
0 +
∫ t
0
ν˜0u du and t ∈ [0, T ] . Therefore, J0 is coercive.
Putting together Corollary 5.8, identity (5.16), and the reasoning of Lemma 4.1, we conclude:
Theorem 5.9. Under condition (5.14), there exists a unique solution ν∗,0 of the optimization problem
ν∗,0 = argmaxν0∈Ac,0 J0
(
ν0
)
. (5.17)
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Moreover, we characterize it as the solution of the system
q∗,0t = q
0
0 +
∫ t
0
ν∗,0u du,
2κ0tν
∗,0
t = 2
∫ t
0
λ0uq
∗,0
u du−
∫ t
0
α0uν
∗,0
u du−
∫ t
0
E
[
α0uν
(
ν∗,0
)
u
+ ou|F0u
]
du+ α0t q
∗,0
t
+
(
L
∗ (
α0q∗,0
))
t
+M∗,0t ,
q∗,00 = q
0
0 and q
∗,0
T = 0,
(5.18)
for some square-integrable martingale
{
M∗,0t ,F0t
}
06t6T
.
Consequently, if we condense (5.2), Proposition 5.4, and Theorem 5.9, we can describe the optimal leader
strategy ν∗,0 and the population’s NE ν via a coupled FBSDE system including an adjoint state.
Corollary 5.10. Let us assume that
(
q0,p,ϕ, x0,x,ψ,M0,M1,Γ
)
solves the adjoined FBSDE
dq0t =
x0t
2κ0t
dt,
dpt = K
−1
t yt dt,
−dϕt =
(
Σt − 1Nβt
)
ψt dt− dΓt,
−dx0t = −2λ0t q0t + α
0
t
2κ0t
x0t dt+
α0t
N E
[
1
ᵀ
NK
−1
t (yt + bt) |F0t
]
dt
+E
[
ot|F0t
]
dt− d (α0t q0t + α0tE [1ᵀNψt|F0t ])− dM0t ,
−dyt = Pt (Ctyt) dt−
(
Σt − 1Nβt
)
pt dt+Pt
(
α0t ν
0
t 1N
)
dt− dM1t ,
dψt = −K−1t ϕt dt+Pt (Cᵀtψt) dt+Pt
(
α0t
N q
0
tK
−1
t 1N
)
dt,
q00 given in L
2
(
Ω,F00
)
, q0T = 0,
p0 = 0, pT = 0,
ψ0 = 0 and ψT = 0,
where M1,Γ ∈ M(N), and
{
M0t ,F0t
}
06t6T is a square-integrable martingale. Then, the process ν
0 :=(
2κ0
)−1
x0 is the optimal control for the leader, whereas ν := K−1 (y + b) is the Nash equilibrium of the
followers.
5.4. Constant model parameters
Let us assume all model parameters and initial datum are constant. We also suppose that, among the
population of followers, parameters are homogeneous, i.e.,
αi ≡ α, κi ≡ κ, λi ≡ λ and βi ≡ 0.
For simplicity, we assume an absent background noise o ≡ 0, and that the initial inventory holdings of the
followers vanish in average. It is straightforward to derive that these simplifying assumptions imply 1ᵀNb ≡ 0
(cf. equation (5.3)).
Let us assume
(
q0,p,ϕ, x0,y,ψ
)
solves the adjoined FBSDE system presented in Corollary 5.10. We
introduce the dependent variables
p :=
1
N
1
ᵀ
Np, y :=
1
N
1
ᵀ
Ny, ϕ := 1
ᵀ
Nϕ and ψ := 1
ᵀ
Nψ.
We remark that 2κy is the average rate of trading of the minor agents in the Nash equilibrium, and likewise
p is their average inventory holdings. In the present deterministic setting, we derive from Corollary 5.10
that
E =
(
q0, p, ϕ
)ᵀ
and F =
(
x0, y, ψ
)ᵀ
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solve the ODE system {
E˙ = H1F ,
F˙ = H2E +H3F ,
with boundary conditions (BC)
E1(0) = q
0
0 , E1(T ) = 0, E2(0) = 0, E2(T ) = 0, F3(0) = 0 and F3(T ) = 0,
where E = (E1, E2, E3)
ᵀ
, F = (F1, F2, F3)
ᵀ
, e1 = (1, 0, 0)
ᵀ
, and the matrices H1,H2 and H3 are given
by
H1 =
 12κ0 0 00 12κ 0
0 0 −2λ
 ,
H2 =
2λ0 + (α
0)
2
2κ 0 −α
0
2κ
0 2λ 0
α0
2κ 0 − 12κ
 ,
and
H3 =
 0 −α02κ α0α2κ (1− 1N )− α02κ0 − α2κ (1− 1N ) 0
0 0 α2κ
(
1− 1N
)
 .
We can express everything in terms of E only, as in Theorem 3.11; it solves the ODE system
E¨ = H1H3H
−1
1 E˙ +H1H2E, in ]0, T [ , (5.19)
with BC 
E1(0) = q
0
0 , E1(T ) = 0,
E2(0) = 0, E2(T ) = 0,
E˙3(0) = 0 and E˙3(T ) = 0.
(5.20)
The last main result of this paper concerns the existence and uniqueness of a classical solution of the
ODE (5.19) with BC (5.20). In preparation to prove it, we observe that E solves (5.19) and (5.20) if, and
only if,
g ≡ (g1, g2, g3)ᵀ := H−11
(
E − q00
(
1− t
T
)
e1
)
solves
g¨ = H3g˙ +H2H1g + h, in ]0, T [ , (5.21)
with homogeneous BC 
g1(0) = 0, g1(T ) = 0,
g2(0) = 0, g2(T ) = 0,
g˙3(0) = 0 and g˙3(T ) = 0,
(5.22)
where
h(t) := −q
0
0
T
H3H
−1
1 e1 + q
0
0
(
1− t
T
)
H2e1.
We introduce the Hilbert space
H := {v = (v1, v2, v3)ᵀ :v, v˙ ∈ L2 (0, T ) , and v1(0) = v1(T ) = v2(0) = v2(T ) = 0},
with the inner product
(v,w)H :=
∫ T
0
(v˙ · w˙ + v ·w) dt.
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Lemma 5.11. Let us assume that
c∗ < 16λ∗, (5.23)
where
c∗ :=
(
α0
)2( 1
κ0
− 1
κ
)2
+
(α
κ
)2 [
1 +
(
α0
)2](
1− 1
N
)2
and
λ∗ :=
λ
κ
∧
1
2
λ0
κ0
+
(
α0
)2
4κκ0
+
λ
κ
−
√√√√(λ0
κ0
+
(α0)
2
4κκ0
− λ
κ
)2
+
(α0)
2
λ
κ2κ0

 .
Then, the bilinear form b : H×H → R defined as
b (v,w) :=
∫ T
0
(v˙ · w˙ + v ·H3w˙ + v ·H2H1w) dt (5.24)
is coercive, i.e.,
b (v,v) > C‖v‖2H.
Proof. On the one hand, let us observe that the matrix H2H1 is strictly positive definite, and its smallest
eigenvalue is precisely λ∗. On the other hand, it is straightforward to see that∣∣∣∣∣
∫ T
0
v ·H3v˙ dt
∣∣∣∣∣ 6  |v˙|2 + c∗16 |v|2 ,
for every v ∈ H. Therefore,
b (v,v) > (1− ) |v˙|2 +
(
λ∗ − c
∗
16
)
|v|2 .
Choosing  ∈ ]0, 1[ suitably, i.e.,
c∗
16λ∗
<  < 1,
we establish the result.
Theorem 5.12. Under the weak interaction assumption (5.23) of Lemma 5.11, the ODE (5.21) with BC
(5.22) has a unique twice continuously differentiable solution.
Proof. Since the bilinear form b we defined in (5.24) is continuous, as well as the linear functional
v ∈ H 7→ −
∫ T
0
h · v dt ∈ R,
it follows from the Lax-Milgram Lemma, see [13, Corollary 5.8], that there exists a unique g ∈ H such that
b (g,v) = −
∫ T
0
h · v dt, (5.25)
for every v ∈ H. We claim that g¨ ∈ L2 (0, T ) . In effect, for every infinitely differentiable v, compactly
supported within ]0, T [ , we have the subsequent relations in the distributional sense:
〈g¨,v〉 = −
∫ T
0
g˙ · v˙ dt
=
∫ T
0
(H3g˙ +H2H1g + h) · v dt.
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Thus, our assertion is valid, and we further have that (5.21) is valid at a.e. t ∈ [0, T ] .
The memberships of the functions g, g˙ and g¨ in L2 (0, T ) imply g, g˙ ∈ C ([0, T ]) , see [24, Chapter 5,
Section 5.9, Theorem 2 (i)], whence the right-hand side of (5.21) is continuous. From [44, Chapter 6, Section
6.10], we conclude that g is of class C2 (i.e., twice continuously differentiable).
Since g = (g1, g2, g3)
ᵀ ∈ H, the adequate boundary conditions for g1 and g2 hold. As for g3, let us test
equation (5.21) against a v ∈ H to obtain:
0 =
∫ T
0
(−g¨ +H3g˙ +H2H1g + h) · v dt
= g˙ · v
∣∣∣t=T
t=0
+ b (g,v) +
∫ T
0
h · v dt
= g˙3(T )v3(T )− g˙3(0)v3(0).
The arbitrariness of v3(0) and v3(T ) implies g˙3(0) = g˙3(T ) = 0.
Finally, we notice that there can be only one C2 solution g of (5.21) with BC (5.22). Indeed, any
function solving this problem must solve the variational one, (5.25), which we proved that admits a single
solution.
We present an illustration of the current situation in Figure 4. We obtained it by numerically solving
the ODE system (5.19) with BC (5.20). The parameters we employed in this simulation are in Table 4.
q00 α
0 κ0 λ0 α κ λ
1 5× 10−5 2.5× 10−5 5× 10−4 3× 10−5 1.5× 10−5 5× 10−7
Table 4: Parameters we used in the simulation of the hierarchical market. We fixed T = 1 and N = 5.
Figure 4: Leader’s inventory evolution, and the dynamics of the average holdings of the followers.
6. Conclusions
We analyzed a finite population stochastic differential game of optimal trading. We allowed asymmetry
of information, as well as for parameters to be stochastic in our model, with mild assumptions. Preferences
were completely heterogeneous among the agents, and differences in their choices were not only due to
informational asymmetry. In the first two parts of the work, we investigated Nash equilibria in two settings:
the unconstrained and the constrained ones. In the third one, we extended the basic model to a hierarchical
market. We introduced hierarchy by assuming there was a leader, also called a leader, having a first-mover
advantage, apart from the population of minor traders, which we referred to as followers.
In the unconstrained setting, we characterized the Nash equilibrium as a solution of a coupled vector
FBSDE. Employing a continuation technique, we proved that the latter system had a unique solution, under
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weak interaction. Therefore, given market parameters and initial inventories and cash amounts, a unique
corresponding Nash equilibrium exists. Assuming parameters to be constant, we deduced that the FBSDE
becomes an ODE, and we obtained semi-explicit forms for it. With the further assumption of homogeneous
parameters, we could compare the resulting average inventory with its MFG counterpart.
For the constrained problem, we proved that Nash equilibria are characterized by an FBSDE, which is
quite close to that of the unconstrained one, differing only on the terminal condition. We obtained bounds on
the solution and corresponding inventory process, uniformly on the terminal penalization parameter, under
a more stringent weak interaction assumption. Using functional analytic arguments, we established that
the limit was the constrained Nash equilibrium. Putting ourselves under a suitable framework, we proved
the convergence of the average speed of trading of the Nash equilibrium of the finite population game to
the mean-field optimal aggregation rate, as the population size tends to infinity. We also provided a rate of
convergence.
We proceeded in two steps to study the hierarchical game. Firstly, we assumed that the leader’s strategy
was given and derived properties of the followers’ Nash equilibrium in terms of it. It was appropriate to
factor this Nash equilibrium in two parts: one of pure arbitrage and another concerning inventory execution.
In the sequel, we feedback the Nash equilibrium of the population, in terms of the leading strategy, in the
leader’s objective functional. In this way, we rendered the major problem into a single-player optimization.
We proved the existence and uniqueness of optimal control, under a suitable weak interaction assumption.
We finished this part by discussing the case of constant parameters, assuming homogeneity among followers.
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